The Case of Chenco International Inc. v. China Pacific Insurance Co., Shanghai Branch over the Dispute of Vessel Insurance Contract

美国陈氏公司诉中国太平洋保险公司船舶保险合同纠纷案

The Case of Chenco International Inc. v. China Pacific Insurance Co., Shanghai Branch over the Dispute of Vessel Insurance Contract

Shanghai Maritime Court of the People's Republic of China

Civil Judgment

Judgment of the Commercial Tribunal No. 486 (1997)

Plaintiff: Chenco International Inc. , domiciled at No. 106 North Merdian Puyallup, Washington 98371 USA.

Legal Representative: Chen Shouren, President

Agent per proc Xu Juanfang, Attorney of Shanghai SiWei Law Office

Defendant: China Pacific Insurance Co., Shanghai Branch, domiciled at No. 507 Fuzhou Road, Shanghai

Person in-charge: Zhu Qing, General Manager

Agent per proc Jiang Huaijiang, Yin Dongnian, Attorneys of Shanghai Haixiang (海翔) Law Office

As per the case of Chenco International Inc. v. China Pacific Insurance Co., Shanghai Branch over the dispute of the vessel insurance contract, the plaintiff raised the lawsuit in this Court on November 28, 1997. After we accepted the case, a collegiate bench was formed accordingly and conducted public trials on April 10, April 20 and June 26, 1998. The legal representative of the plaintiff Chen Shouren, the authorized agent of the plaintiff Xu Juanfang, the authorized agent of the defendant Wang Huaijiang appeared in court for all the trials, and the other authorized agent of the defendant Yin Dongnian appeared in court for the first trial. The case is now closed.

The Plaintiff claimed that:

The plaintiff and the defendant executed the vessel voyage towing insurance contract on February 27, 1995. The insurance policy stated the insured was Chenco International Inc., the insured vessel was “Canadian Harvest”, the plaintiff provided the information of the insured vessel, the insurable value and insured value was USD $124,900, the rate for insurance premium was 2.1％, the insurance premium was USD $26,241.60, the navigation scope i.e. the insurance liability period was from Montreal, Canada via the Cape of Good Hope to China. The insurance period or voyage was stated on April 20, 1995 (but the termination date was not clearly defined). The insurance conditions were those as provided in the vessel insurance clauses of the People's Insurance Co. of China (“PICC”) formulated on January 1, 1986, but the defendant neither provided the aforesaid clauses to the plaintiff, nor did it disclose the relevant content of the clauses. The following was stated in the annotations and commentaries of the aforesaid policy: (1) the vessel towed must have a certificate of towability; (2) the insurance premiums shall be paid off before April 20, 1995, otherwise the insurance policy shall be invalidated. The plaintiff has paid off the premiums accordingly, and the insurance contract should be valid. On May 16, 1995, the Marine Surveyor Claude Lemay issued the towability certificate certifying that “Canadian Harvest” was suitable to be towed from Montreal, Canada to China by the ship Neftegaz – 16. On May 29, 1995, the towing was started and both vessels departed. On June 5, the main engines of the tugboat malfunctioned. On June 14, it's towed back to Guysborough, Canada for repairs. The plaintiff orally reported the above to the defendant through the relevant personnel. Thereafter the tugboat was repaired and the Marine Surveyor Claude Lemay issued the seaworthiness certificate on October 10, 1995. On December 1, 1995, the towing was started, and the navigation was resumed. On December 3, attacked by hurricane and high waves at outer sea of Canada, “Canadian Harvest” was broken down with the stern immediately flowing away and the bow still towed by the tugboat. Due to the significant hazards imposed to the safety of the voyage by the bow towed, the bow of the broken vessel was decided to be given up, then “Canadian Harvest” was totally lost. For this accident at sea, the Coastal Guards in Halifax Center announced the navigational notices.

The plaintiff claimed that:

The liability period for vessel voyage insurance started from the towing port where the ship was cast off and set sail to the destination port where the anchor was dropped, and all the losses caused by any peril of the sea to the vessel within the navigation scope should be indemnified by the insurer. But the defendant delayed and tried to avoid the indemnifications without good reasons. Therefore, the plaintiff hereby requests the Court to order the defendant to indemnify the total loss of “Canadian Harvest” insured by the plaintiff at the amount of USD $1,249,600 and the loss of interest caused by the delayed indemnifications, and to pay the litigation fee and associated expenses. During the trials, the plaintiff raised the allegation that the loss of interest should be computed at the interest rate for bank loans in USD by domestic enterprises at the time.

During the trials, the authorized agent of the plaintiff reemphasized the insurance liability period hereby involved should start from the time when the “Canadian Harvest” was cast off and set sail at Montreal, Canada and connected to the tugboat until it was moored or the anchor was dropped at a Chinese port. While “Starting on 20th April, 1995” as appear on the insurance policy meant that the insurance liability period should be started on April 20, 1995 rather than the time when the insured vessel started to be towed. The insurance policy involved has never been declared as rescinded by the defendant until the opening of the trials. As a result, although the plaintiff delayed the payment, the insurance policy should be still valid. There was no factual basis for the defendant to cite Article 6, Clause 3 of its vessel insurance clauses. Since the plaintiff has insured useless vessels for recycling for several times with the defendant, the defendant should in fact know that the “Canadian Harvest” insured was a useless vessel for recycling and so charged a insurance premium at the high rate of 2.1%. As a result, there was no factual basis for the defendant to cite Article 4 of the vessel insurance clauses as well. The plaintiff has ownership over the insured vessel. Even before acquiring the ownership, the plaintiff still had the rights of operating and managing the vessel and associated insurable interests. Therefore, the plaintiff was a party eligible for claiming indemnifications. Concerning the loss of interest, the plaintiff requested that it be computed at the yearly rate of 8% as of December 26, 1995 until the day when the judgment is made.

The defendant failed to submit an answer within the time limit specified by law.

During the trials, the defendant argued that:

According to the situations of the insured vessel, the causes of the accident and other facts, in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations, the defendant should refuse to indemnify.

Besides, the authorized agent of the defendant argued in its statement of attorney that:

Concerning the governing law, since there was no agreement in this regard by both parties in the insurance contract, the stipulations of the Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China (“Maritime Law”) shall be adopted. Since the plaintiff, as the insured, did not inform the significant facts about the insured subject matter at and before the execution of the contract, i.e. the insured vessel was a laker rather than a sea-ship, and voyage was made for the purpose of recycling the vessel, the defendant had the right to rescind the contract after acquiring the relevant knowledge, and did not have to assume any contractual obligations. As the plaintiff delayed the time for starting the tow and accordingly violated the special agreements and the warranty clauses of the insurance policy, the insurance liability of the defendant had automatically been terminated or become invalid since the day when the plaintiff violated the contract. As the plaintiff as the insured had no valid towability certificate, the insurance contract became invalid accordingly. The relevant evidences showed that the destination port for the insured vessel was Alang, India. Therefore, the plaintiff violated the warranty for the destination of towing, and the insurance contract automatically became invalidated as well. Since the plaintiff has not been able to testify that the loss of the vessel was caused by the perils within the insurance coverage listed in the insurance policy, the defendant was in no way responsible for making indemnifications. As the plaintiff has not been able to testify that it had the insured interests, it had no qualification to raise the lawsuit based upon the insurance policy.

In order to support its claim, the plaintiff has submitted the following evidences:

1. Vessel insurance policy, No. PSH00lHI95／2545 – 001;

2. Notice for payment of insurance premium;

3. The towing contract;

4. Vessel purchase contract;

5. The trawlability certificate issued by Claude Lemay on May 16, 1995;

6. Vessel insurance policy, No. PSH001HI95／2545 – 002;

7. The log for the tugboat;

8. Letter from Zhang Wei to Liu Jiguo;

9. The notes for the investigation on Zhang Wei by authorized agent of the plaintiff;

10. The testimony concerning the case by Liu Jiguo;

11. The trawlability certificate issued by Claude Lemay on October 10, 1995;

12. The attestation of Claude Lemay;

13. The affidavit by Bruce Jones of MCA Maritime and Cargo Transportation Agency Co., Ltd;

14. The attestation of Canadian Coastal Guards;

15. Sea Protest of the ship “Neftegaz – 16”;

16 Lloyd's emergency marine protest;

17. The report to the plaintiff by MCA Maritime and Cargo Transportation Agency Co., Ltd.;

18. The report to Canadian Coastal Guards by the Captain of the ship “Neftegaz – 16”;

19. Canadian Coastal Guards' announcements;

20. Documents from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada;

21. The facsimile of London Salvage Association;

22. The attestation issued by MCA Maritime and Cargo Transportation Agency Co., Ltd.;

23. The purchase contract of the vessel involved by Chenco International Inc.;

24. Bill of sale and attestation from Transport Canada;

25. The attestation of Columbia Bank USA;

26. The documents concerning the transfer of the vessel hereby involved to the plaintiff by Chenco Maritime Inc.;

27. Legal bills of sale.

Such evidences above from the plaintiff as 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 were notarized and attested, the defendant did not object to the formality of the evidences in the cross-examinations. Concerning the evidence No. 21 from the plaintiff, the defendant denied it with the facsimile of Sedgwick Investigation Company in Britain. But the facsimile was received earlier than the plaintiff's evidence No. 21, and the facsimile has not notarized or attested. The defendant doubted the authenticity of the plaintiff's evidences 5, 11, 12, 13, 22, but had no adverse evidences presented. The defendant did not acknowledge the plaintiff's evidences 8, 9, 10. The defendant had no objections to the plaintiff's evidences 1, 2, 6.

In order to support its defense, the defendant provided the following evidences to the Court:

The first set of evidences included the vessel insurance policy hereby involved, the insurance policy, the vessel insurance clauses of the PICC formulated on January 1, 1986, bill for the entry of insurance premium, notice to the plaintiff for the refund of insurance premium. The plaintiff has no objections to the authenticity of the evidences above.

The second set of evidences included the port log of MCA Maritime and Cargo Transportation Agency Co., Ltd, the documents of Russian Vessel Registration Bureau, the records for the damage of the main engines of the ship “Neftegaz – 16” the inspection reports, the documents to the plaintiff by MCA Maritime and Cargo Transportation Agency Co., Ltd. The plaintiff had no objections to the formality of the evidences above.

The third set of evidences included the inspection reports and attachments issued by Brookes, Bell & Co. at Britain. The plaintiff claimed that the evidences were of no legal effect as evidences because they have not been notarized or attested.

The fourth set of evidences included the facsimile of Sedgwick Investigation Company in Britain, the towing contract hereby involved and the vessel purchase contract (i.e. the plaintiff's evidences 3, 4. The plaintiff denied the authenticity of the facsimile of Sedgwick Investigation Company at Britain in the cross-examinations.

The fifth set included the report of “A Comparison between the North Atlantic Ocean and the Great Lake on Weather” issued by the registered consultant of American Weather News Co., Ltd, meteorologist Robert L. Cohen, the contemporaneous weather at the location of the accident. The plaintiff claimed that the evidences had no legal effect as evidences because they have not been notarized or attested in the cross-examinations.

The sixth set consisted of the six facsimiles to the plaintiff by the defendant and the four facsimiles to the defendant by the plaintiff, the report to the parent company by the defendant concerning the handling of the case. The plaintiff had no objection to the authenticity of the evidences above.

The seventh set included the two facsimiles to Lawrence E. Nelson, P. S. by the plaintiff, the facsimile to the defendant by the plaintiff, the documents mailed by Liu Jiguo to Zhang Wei. The plaintiff had no objection to the authenticity of the evidences above.

Besides, the defendant also submitted to the Court a facsimile to the defendant by the Chief Marine Engineer of British Salvage Association J. B. Waite. The evidence has not been notarized or attested and the plaintiff denied its legal effect as an evidence. The defendant pleaded the Court to order its employee Zhu Weiguo to appear in court to testify for the relevant facts in respect of the application for insurance. Zhu appeared in court and were inquired by both parties and cross-examined by the plaintiff.

It is held by the present court that:

In accordance with the stipulations on the evidences of the law of the People's Republic of China on Civil Procedures, the evidences submitted by one party should be affirmed if the other party has no objections, or has objections but has no sufficient evidences to preempt or only has evidences same with the evidences submitted; the evidences acquired overseas have to be notarized and attested unless the other party recognized. The witness shall testify in court unless the other party acknowledged the corresponding testimony. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff' s evidences 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 are legally valid. But the insured vessel hereby involved was a laker, while the translation of the plaintiff's evidence 15 was incorrect and should be rectified. The plaintiff's evidences 8, 9, 10 are witness' testimonies. Since the witnesses did not appear in court and could not be cross-examined by the defendant for its doubts, the Court does not acknowledge their legal effect as evidences. Although in the second set of the evidences of the defendant, the port log indicated the destination port was Alang, India for the vessel hereby involved, it will not be taken as the basis for the judgment of the case because it is trumped by the validity of the plaintiff's evidence 22. The third and fifth sets of evidences of the defendant and the facsimiles by Sedgwick Investigation Company in Britain among the fourth set, as well as the facsimile to the defendant by the Chief Marine Engineer of British Salvage Association J. B. Wait also had no legal effect as evidences because they had not been notarized or attested. The other evidences of the defendant shall be recognized accordingly.

Based upon the facts from the valid evidences aforesaid, the Court have found that:

On February 27, 1995, according to the plaintiff's application for insurance, the defendant signed two vessel insurance policies: No. PSH001HI95/2545 – 001 and No. PSH00lHI95/2545 - 002. The insurance policy No. PSH001HI95/2545 – 001 stated as follows: the insured was the plaintiff, the insured vessel was “Canadian Harvest”, ship kind was bulk carrier, total tonnage was 7810 tons, it was constructed in 1965, and the construction location, the registration location, classification and flag were all Canada, the insurance value and insurance amount was USD $ 1,249,600, the rate for insurance premium was 2.1％, the insurance premium was USD $ 26,241.60, the insurance conditions were those as provided in the vessel insurance clauses of the PICC formulated on January 1, 1986 for the total loss and salvage, the navigation scope was from Montreal, Canada via the Cape of Good Hope to China, the insurance period/voyage was to start on April 20, 1995, the exemption amount was USD $ 5000. The annotations and commentaries of the insurance policy said that “the insured shall obtain the towability certificate issued by a qualified surveyor for the vessel hereby referred to, otherwise the insurance policy shall be invalidated. The insured shall pay for the insurance premium before April 20, 1995, otherwise the insurer shall have the right to rescind the insurance policy”. The other insurance policy contained the same content except for the vessel information. But the defendant issued the enforcement for the insurance policy on April 19, 1995, in which the insurance period was changed into “starting on April 30, 1995 until the vessel arriving in China”. The defendant received the insurance premium from the plaintiff on June 3, 1995.

The hereby involved vessel insured by the plaintiff was purchased by Chenco Maritime Inc. from Upper Lakes Shipping Co. at Canada on February 16, 1995 at the contractual price of USD $ 21,900. Then Chenco Maritime Inc. transferred the ownership of the vessel to the plaintiff. On April 6, 1995, the plaintiff sold the two vessels to Changzhou YiSheng Vessel Recycling Co., Ltd. upon the execution of the vessel purchase contract at the price of USD $ 160 per long ton for delivery to China and the delivery time was set between July and August of 1995. On March 22, 1995, the plaintiff executed the international vessel towing contract labeled “TOW－CON” with M. R Cruise Co., Ltd. at Panama, agreeing that the ship Ahis Neftegaz – 16 would tow the two vessels hereby involved from Solaire, Canada to a safe port in Northern China and the earliest date for departing was thought to be between April 26 and May 2, 1995.

On May 16, 1995, the Marine Surveyor of Grobesque Maritime Inc. at Canada Claude Lemay issued towability certificate for two vessels hereby involved, stating that “the inspector has inspected the Canadian Pathfinder'and “Canadian Harvest”, and affirmed that the two vessels have satisfied the requirements for being towed from Montreal, Canada to China by the ship ‘Neftegaz – 16'. The advices have been submitted to the Capitan of the tugboat for the above voyage and the towing can be started on May 16, 1995 from every aspect.” At 23:30 of April 24, 1995, the tugboat hereby involved arrived at the Port of Montreal. After such preparations for towing as repairing engines and getting gas, the tugboat towed two vessels hereby involved to leave P. W. Pick at 12:30 of May 30, 1995. On June 5, 1995, the props of the ship “Neftegaz – 16” were entangled and entwisted, the main engines on the left shipboard stalled and the ones on the right shipboard were also damaged due to the loss of the pressure of the lube oil. On June 14, 1995, the vessel stopped at Guysborough, Nova Scotia. On October 3, 1995, the vessel was removed to Halifax for repairs. Before that, Russian Vessel Registration Bureau has inspected the damages of tugboat.

On October 10, 1995, the Marine Surveyor of Grobesque Maritime Inc. at Canada Claude Lemay issued towability certificate for two vessels again, stating that the vessel “could be towed on October 10, 1995”. On December 1, 1995, the ship “Neftegaz – 16” started the towing again. On December 3, 1995 at Canadian time 06:24, at North Latitude 44 º 25' 8', West Longitude 57 º 09.3', the first mate of the tugboat saw the stern of “Canadian Harvest” departing from the hull via radar. The weather at the time: wind 320º, 20～25m/s, wave 315º, 6～7 meters, visibility 5 sea miles. At 20:00 of December 4, 1995, wind 22m/s, 195º, wave 5 meters. At 00:00 of December 5, 1995, wind approximately 30 m/s, wave 8 meters. At 04:48 of the same day, at North Latitude 42 º 30.6', West Longitude 53 º 45.9', for avoiding to damage the tugboat and for the safety of the ship “Canadian Pathfinder”, the towing cables of the “Canadian Harvest” were loosed from the towing machine of the tugboat and thrown away from the board, the wreckage of the vessel sank. At the time of the accident, according to the reports of the Captain of the tugboat, Canada Coastal Guards issued the navigational announcements. Lloyd's also issued the emergency marine protest.

On December 4, 1995, the plaintiff informed the accident of the insured vessel to the defendant via facsimile. Until December 28, 1995, the plaintiff and the defendant negotiated the matters of indemnifications via facsimile many times. For example, the plaintiff claimed in the facsimile of December 7 that: “the day to start towing the vessel is estimated to be on April 20, 1995”, but it did “set sail on May 29 due to various reasons”. In its facsimile of December 26, the defendant was of the opinion that the insurance contract has expired because of the delay of towing of the insured vessel.

“Canadian Harvest” was once called Rimouski. The vessel and the ship “Canadian Pathfinder”are lakers navigating in Great Lake areas of Canada, inland rivers and St. Laurence waterways. There is no valid evidence to testify that the plaintiff has informed the defendant before the accident the facts of the starting time for two towings by the tugboat hereby involved and the significant repairs of the tugboat, nor are there any evidence to prove that the plaintiff has informed the defendant before the execution of the contract the navigating purpose of the insured vessel hereby involved was for recycling and the fact that the vessels were lakers.

All contents of the vessel insurance clauses of the PICC formulated on January 1, 1986 were printed on the back of the insurance policy. Article 4 “the sea transport” stated that “unless the insurer agrees in advance and accepts additional insurance premium for the amended insurance conditions, the insurance shall not cover the losses and obligations for the following matters: A. the insured vessel engages in the services of towing or salvaging. B. (omitted) .C. the insured vessel voyages for the purpose of recycling or sale for recycling.” Article 6 of “the termination of the insurance” stated that “when there are violations to clauses of the insurance policy concerning the cargo, voyage, navigating area, towing, salvaging or the departing date, after acquiring the information, the insured shall immediately inform the insurer and accept the amended insurance conditions and additional insurance premium needed. The insurance will remain valid. Otherwise, the insurance shall automatically be terminated.” Article 5 of “the insurance period” stated that “C. voyage insurance: in accordance with the voyage specified in the insurance policy. The starting and ending time shall comply with the following: 1. Vessels carrying no cargo, from the time when the vessel is cast off and set sail at the departure port until the time when the anchor was dropped or the vessel was moored at the destination port. 2. Vessels carrying cargo, from loading up at the departure port to the completion of unloading at the destination port, which, however, shall not exceed 30 days after 00:00 of the day when the vessel arriving at the destination port.”

The Court is of the opinions that:

Since the parties are enterprises registered in different countries, the case is foreign-related. According to law, unless otherwise provided, the parties to a foreign-related contract may select the governing law to the contract. If the parties to the contract have not made the selection, the laws of the country with the closest connection to the contract shall be applied. We have found that there was no clause concerning the governing law in the contract hereby involved and the relevant laws have no special stipulations on the governing law of the foreign-related insurance contract. And the insurance contract was executed in Shanghai, and in the contract, the destination port for the insured vessel to be towed to was a Chinese port. Therefore, we concluded the laws of the People's Republic of China are among “the laws of the country with the most intimate relations to the contract”. The case shall be governed by the Maritime Law and other applicable laws and regulations. In order to perform the vessel purchase contract with Changzhou Yisheng Vessel Recycling Co., Ltd, the plaintiff bought the insurance from the defendant for the vessel, and the defendant agreed to accept the insurance application and issued the vessel insurance policy. The vessel insurance contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was validly established and both parties should perform the obligations under the contract according to the stipulations of laws and the agreements of the contract. The fact of the insured vessel used for recycling has been attested in the trials, and the plaintiff also affirmed, but there was no evidence to prove that the plaintiff has disclosed the fact to the defendant before the execution of the contract. According to Article 222, Paragraph 1 of the of the Maritime Law, “before the execution of the contract, the insured shall fully and accurately disclose to the insurer the significant facts it knows or should have known during its normal business which would affect the determination of the rate for insurance premium or the acceptance of the insurance application by the insurer.” The peril of the insured subject matter is a significant factor for the insurer to set the rate of the insurance premium or to decide whether to accept the insurance application. Compared with the normal vessels, it is obvious that the vessels for recycling are in a position of more perils on the sea. Generally speaking, if the insurer knew the fact, it will impose additional conditions such as raising the insurance premium. Article 4 of the insurance clauses hereby involved also clearly indicated that, if the insured vessel navigated for the purpose of recycling or sale for recycling, unless the insurer agreed in advance and accepted additional insurance premium for the amended insurance conditions, the insurer should not be responsible for the losses or liabilities caused by such factors. Therefore, it shall be concluded as follows, although there is no clear definition for “significant matters” in the Maritime Law, all matters increasing the perils of insurance shall be “significant matters”. The insured vessel was used for recycling, which is obviously within “significant matters”. The plaintiff has not disclosed the fact to the defendant before the execution of the contract. Therefore, it violated not only the stipulations of the insurance clauses, but also the provisions of the law. Since the vessel for recycling extended significant influences on the happening of the accident, no matter whether the plaintiff failed to disclose on purpose or not, the defendant had the due right to rescind the contract without any liability of indemnity according to Article 223 of the Maritime Law. It lacked the support of the evidences the plaintiff's claim that it had bought insurance for the useless vessel for recycling from the defendant for many times and the defendant in fact knew the vessel was a useless one for recycling and so charged a high 2.1% insurance premium when the vessel was insured.

The Court holds that:

The provision about the time to set sail has constituted constitutes a warranty clause. If the insured violates the clause, the insurer has the right to terminate the contract or ask for amending the insurance conditions, or increasing the insurance premium. If the insured violates the warranty clause, it shall immediately inform the insurer. If the insured fails to inform, the insurer's rights will not be affected. The case involves the vessel voyage insurance contract, with which both parties agreed and had no objection. Since the vessel hereby involved carried no cargo, in accordance with Article 5 of the insurance clauses hereby involved, the insurance period for voyage of vessels carrying no cargoes was from the day when the vessel was cast off and set sail at the departure port until the day when the anchor was dropped or moored at the destination port. Therefore, “starting on April 20, 1995” stated in the insurance period or the voyage of the insurance policy hereby involved did not mean that the vessel hereby involved must start to be towed on that day, nor did it indicate that it would comply with the stipulations of the contract for the vessel hereby involved to be towed anytime after the day as well. According to the characteristics of vessel voyage insurance and customs of the insurance sector, the reasonable interpretation shall be that the insured vessel shall be towed on the day or within the reasonable time after the day. If the towing started exceeding the reasonable time, there may be perils related to insurance unpredictable at the time of the execution of the contract in the planned voyage, which may essentially change the basis for the establishment of the contract. Therefore, it constitutes a warranty clause to provide the time for depart within the reasonable time. In accordance with the insurance policy hereby involved, the voyage hereby involved should start on April 20, 1995, but the first departing time for the insured vessel “Canadian Harvest” was one May 30, 1995. There were forty days between two dates. It could not be regarded as departing within the reasonable time. Later, due to the significant repairs to the tugboat “Neftegaz – 16”, the towing was just resumed on December 12, 1995. The plaintiff has not timely disclosed all matters above to the defendant. The omission of the plaintiff violated the contractual obligations stipulated by Article 6 of the insurance clauses hereby involved, and at the same time, it also violated Article 235 of the Maritime Law. The plaintiff shall assume the corresponding legal obligations.

The Court holds that:

There were surely no evidence to prove that the plaintiff has disclosed the matters related to “Canadian Harvest” as a laker to the defendant before the execution of the contract. However, if the defendant, based upon the above, insisted that the plaintiff violated Article 222, Paragraph 1 of the Maritime Law, the reasons and evidences were not sufficient. For the vessel hereby involved being towed from Canada to China, the Marine Surveyor of Grobesque Maritime Inc., Canada, Claude Lemay issued towability certificate twice. The defendant claimed the towability certificates to be invalid, but there were no evidences to prove. Therefore, the validity of towability certificates shall be affirmed. The destination port of the insured vessel hereby involved was a port of China, as testified by the insurance policy, vessel purchase contract and other evidences. It is not persuasive for the defendant to insist that the plaintiff's destination port was Alang, India to simply base upon a port log. Concerning the facts of Chenco Maritime Inc.'s purchasing the vessel hereby involved and transferring to the plaintiff for export and sale, there are sufficient evidences to prove. The plaintiff, therefore, had insurable interests in the insured vessel according to applicable laws and regulations and had the right to raise the lawsuit. “Canadian Harvest” was attacked by hurricane and high waves during the navigation and sunk with a total loss. There are no sufficient evidences to testify the defendant's claim that the plaintiff has not been able to prove the loss of the insured subject matter was caused by the perils listed by the insurance policy. Since all contents of the vessel insurance clauses of the PICC formulated on January 1, 1986 were printed on the back of the insurance policy hereby involved, it is not supported by the facts the plaintiff's claim that the defendant has neither provided the vessel insurance clauses to the plaintiff, nor did it disclose the relevant content.

As a conclusion, the insurance contract hereby involved has been legally established. The plaintiff had insurable interests in the “Canadian Harvest”, and was entitled to raise the lawsuit. But, since the plaintiff failed to disclose to the defendant about the fact that the vessel was used for recycling before the execution of the contract; and during the performance of the contract, the plaintiff failed to timely inform the defendant about the facts that the hereby involved tugboat's failing to depart within the reasonable time and undertaking significant repairs as well as the time for the re-towing. Both failures violated the stipulations of laws and the stipulations of the contract. Therefore, the Court shall not support the plaintiff's claim in the lawsuit.

We hereby, in accordance with Article 221, Clause 1 of Article 222, Article 223 and Article 235 of the Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China, rule as follows:

The plaintiff, Chenco International Co.'s claim shall not be affirmed.

The litigation fee Renminbi 61,868.40 shall be paid by the plaintiff.

If refusing to accept the present judgment, the plaintiff may, within 30 days, and the defendant may, within 15 days, after the delivery of the present judgment, submit the Petition for Appeal to this Court, and provide as many copies as there are other parties, so as to appeal to the Shanghai Municipal Higher People's Court. Within 7 days immediately after the next day of the day of submitting the Petition of Appeal, the party shall submit the fee for appeal to the Court in the amount of the litigation fee for the first instance judgment set in the present judgment in advance. If failing to submit the fee within the time specified, it will automatically be treated as withdrawing the appeal.

Presiding Judge Ni Chunyu

Judge Wang Guoliang

Judge Yang Lisha

December 13, 1999

Clerk Shen Jun

Comments:

The characteristics of the present judgment are as follows: objectively describing the facts of the case, stressing the use of the evidence, reasonably interpreting the clauses of the contract and the relevant laws, detailed discussions, sufficient expressions.

A. The judgment stressed the principles of evidence for attesting the facts of the case, and fully and clearly described both parties' arguments, quoting evidences, cross-examinations and the Court's argumentation. The present judgment also listed the evidences submitted by both parties in detail, examined and analyzed the evidences one by one, and clarified the reasons for whether to recognize. Based upon above, the facts of the case is affirmed with sufficient basis.

B. The reasoning of the judgment is clear and sufficient. Before the judgment on substantial issues, the applicable laws are affirmed at first, which is the characteristic of the trials of the foreign-related cases. In the meantime, the major legal issues related to the case have been analyzed and interpreted respectively. For example, since the peril for towing vessels for recycling is bigger than ordinary vessel towed, and the plaintiff as the owner of the vessel failed to inform the significant fact to the insurer before the execution of the contract fully and accurately, the plaintiff violated the principle of full and accurate disclosure in marine insurance. The insurer has the right to terminate the contract and does not have to assume the liability of indemnity. In voyage insurance contracts, it constitutes the warranty clause to provide the departure within a reasonable time. If the plaintiff violates the stipulation, it shall immediately inform the insurer, and the insurer has the option to terminate the contract or amend insurance conditions. On the above ground, the present Court rejected the plaintiff's claim accordingly.

美国陈氏公司诉中国太平洋保险公司

上海海事法院
民事判决书

(1997)沪海法商字第486号

　　原告　美国陈氏公司(Chenco International Inc.)。
　　委托代理人　徐娟芳，上海市四维律师事务所律师。
　　被告　中国太平洋保险公司上海分公司。
　　负责人　诸清，总经理。
　　委托代理人　汪淮江，尹东年，上海市海翔律师事务所律师。
　　原告美国陈氏公司与被告中国太平洋保险公司上海分公司船舶保险合同纠纷一案，原告于1997年11月28日起诉至本院。本院受理后，依法组成合议庭，于1998年4月10日、4月20日和6月26日公开开庭进行了审理。原告法定代表人陈守仁、委托代理人徐娟芳，被告委托代理人汪淮江到庭参加诉讼，被告另一委托代理人尹东年参加了第一次庭审。本案现已审理完结。
　　原告诉称：原、被告双方于1995年2月27日订立了船舶航次拖航保险合同。保险单载明被保险人是美国陈氏公司，被保险船舶“加拿大丰收”轮(CANADIAN HARVEST)，原告提供了保险船舶资料，保险价值和保险金额124900美元，保险费率2．1%，保险费26241．60美元，航行范围即保险责任期间自加拿大蒙特利尔经好望角到中国，保险期限或航程写明1995年4月20日(但没写终止日期)，保险条件适用中国人民保险公司1986年1月1日船舶保险条款，但被告未向原告提供该保险条款，也未告知该条款的有关内容。批柱栏特别约定：(1)被拖船舶必须具有适拖证书；(2)保险费必须在1995年4月20日付清，否则本保险单失效。原告按照规定付清了保险费，该保险合同当然生效。1995年5月16日经海事检验员克来得·雷迈(Claude Lemay)出具适拖证书，证明“加拿大丰收”轮适合在“尼夫塔各兹－16”轮(Neftegaz－16)拖拽下从加拿大蒙特利尔到中国的要求。同年5月29日起拖开航，6月5日拖轮主机发生故障，6月14日拖回加拿大莫尔格雷夫港修理。原告将上述情况经有关人员向被告作了口头报告。此后拖轮修复，海事检验员克来得·雷迈于同年10月10日出具适航证书。同年12月1日起拖，恢复航行，12月3日在加拿大外海遭受飓风大浪，“加拿大丰收”轮折断，船尾当即漂走，船头仍由拖轮拖着。鉴于所拖船头对安全航行造成严重危险，决定放弃断船船头，“加拿大丰收”轮全损。为此海上灾害事故，哈利麦斯中心海上警卫队发布了航行通告。
　　原告称，船舶航次保险的责任期间是从起拖港解缆起锚时开始至目的港抛锚或系缆时终止，只要在本航次航行范围内发生的海上灾害致船舶遭受损失的，保险人应当赔偿。但是被告借故推诿拖延赔偿。为此，请求判令被告赔偿原告投保的“加拿大丰收”轮全损1249600美元及因延迟赔付而造成的利息损失，并由被告承担诉讼费和与诉讼有关的费用。庭审时，原告提出其利息损失应按国内企业同期银行美元贷款利率计算。
　　庭审中，原告委托代理人提出代理意见，再次强调本案的保险责任期间应自“加拿大丰收”轮自加拿大蒙特利尔港被解缆起锚挂上拖轮一直到中国港口抛锚或系缆为止，而保险单上的“STARTING ON 20TH APRIL，1995”，是指保险期限从1995年4月20日开始，而不是指被保险船舶的开始起拖时间。涉案保险单直至本案开庭前被告从没有通知过解除，故尽管原告延迟付费，保险单仍应有效。被告援用该公司的船舶保险条款第六条第三款，缺乏事实依据。由于原告在被告公司投保用于拆解的废旧船已有多次，被告实际也了解此次投保的“加拿大丰收”轮是用于拆解的废旧船，并因此而收取了2．1%的高费率保险费，故被告援用船舶保险条款第四条，同样缺乏事实依据。原告对被保险船舶拥有所有权，即使在取得所有权前，对该轮也具有经营管理权和可保利益，因而是合格的索赔主体。关于利息损失，原告要求自1995年12月26日起，按年利率8%算至判决之日止。
　　被告未在法定期限内提交答辩状。庭审中，被告辩称，根据本案被保险船舶的情况以及事故原因等事实，依照法律规定，被告理应拒赔。此外，被告委托代理人在代理意见中称，关于法律适用，由于原、被告在保险合同中并未约定，故应适用我国海商法的规定；由于原告作为被保险人在合同签订前和签订当时，未向被告告知保险标的的重要情况，即被保险船舶是“大湖船”(Laker)而非海船，且是为拆船目的而航行，所以被告有权在获知后解除保险合同，不承担合同责任；由于原告延误起拖时间，违反了保险单的特别约定和保证条款，被告的保险责任自原告违反合同之日起自动终止或自动失效；由于原告作为被保险人缺乏有效的适拖证书，保险合同失去效力；有关证据显示被保险船舶的目的港为印度的Alang港，因而原告违反了拖航目的地的保证，使保险合同的效力同样自动终止；由于原告未能证明船舶损失是保险单所列明的承保风险所引起的，被告因而无赔偿责任；由于原告无法证明其具有保险利益，因而原告不具有依据保险单起诉的资格。
　　原告为支持其诉讼请求，向法庭提交了以下证据：
　　1．船舶保险单，编号PSH001HI95/2545－001；
　　2．保费通知书；
　　3．拖航合同；
　　4．船舶买卖合同；
　　5．由克来得·雷迈于1995年5月16日签发的适拖证书；
　　6．船舶保险单，编号PSH001HI95/2545－002；
　　7．拖轮日志；
　　8．张炜给刘吉国的信；
　　9．原告委托代理人向张炜调查所作的笔录；
　　10．刘吉国关于本案有关情况的证词；
　　11．由克来得·雷迈于1995年10月10日签发的适拖证书；
　　12．克来得·雷迈的证明；
　　13．MCA海事和货运代理有限公司Bruce Jones的宣誓书；
　　14．加拿大海岸警卫队的证明；
　　15．“尼夫塔各兹－16”轮的海事报告；
　　16．劳合社(LLOYD’S)海难事故紧急报告；
　　17．MCA海事和货运代理有限公司给原告的报告；
　　18．“尼夫塔各兹－16”轮船长给加拿大海岸警卫队的报告；
　　19．加拿大海岸警卫队通告；
　　20．加拿大运输安全委员会文件；
　　21．伦敦救助协会的传真文件；
　　22．MCA海事和货运代理有限公司出具的证明书；
　　23．陈氏海事公司购进涉案船舶的买卖合同；
　　24．销售单和加拿大交通部的证明；
　　25．美国哥伦比亚银行的证明；
　　26．涉案船舶由陈氏海事公司转归原告的文件；
　　27．法律销售单据。
　　以上原告证据3、4、5、7、11、12、13、14、15、16、17、18、19、20、21、22、23、24、25、26、27均经公证、认证，被告质证对证据的形式要件无异议。对原告证据21，被告以英国Sedgwick调查公司的传真内容予以否定。但该传真的形成时间早于原告证据21，并且未经公证、认证。对原告证据5、11、12、13、22被告怀疑其真实性，但未提供任何相反的证据。对原告证据8、9、10不予承认。对原告证据1、2、6无任何异议。
　　被告为佐证其诉辩主张，向法庭提供的证据有：
　　第一组，涉案船舶保险单、涉案投保单、中国人民保险公司1986年1月1日船舶保险条款、保险费进账单、给原告的退费通知。原告对以上证据的真实性无任何异议。
　　第二组，MCA海事和货运代理有限公司的港口日志、俄罗斯船舶登记局文件、“尼夫塔各兹－16”轮主机损坏记录、检验报告、MCA海事和货运代理有限公司给原告的文件。原告对以上证据的形式要件无异议。
　　第三组，英国Brookes，Bell & Co．出具的检验报告及附件。原告称该证据未经公证、认证，不产生证据效力。
　　第四组，英国Sedgwick调查公司的传真、涉案拖航合同和船舶买卖合同(即原告证据3、4)。原告质证否认英国Sedgwick调查公司传真的真实性。
　　第五组，美国天气新闻有限公司注册顾问气象学家Robert L．Cohen出具的“北大西洋地区天气情况与大湖地区天气情况的比较”报告、本案事故发生地当时的天气情况。原告质证认为该证据未经公证、认证，不产生证据效力。
　　第六组，被告给原告的6份传真和原告给被告的传真4份、被告给其总公司有关本案处理情况的报告。原告对以上证据的真实性无异议。
　　第七组，被告发给Lawrence E．Nelson，P．S．的传真件2份、原告给被告的传真、刘吉国邮寄给张炜的文件。原告对以上证据的真实性无异议。
　　此外，被告还向法庭提供1份由英国救助协会首席航海工程师J．B．Waite发给被告的传真文件。该证据未经公证、认证，原告否认其证据效力；被告还就本案投保过程的有关事实，请求法庭传唤其工作人员朱卫国出庭作证。朱到庭接受了原、被告双方的询问和原告的质证。
　　本院认为：依照《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》关于证据的规定，当事人一方提供的证据，对方未提出异议，或者虽提出异议但无足够证据予以推翻，或者与对方提供的证据内容相同的，应予确认；从境外取得的证据，除对方承认外，应经公证、认证；证人证言除对方承认外，证人应到庭作证。据此，本院认定原告证据1、2、3、4、5、6、7、11、12、13、14、15、16、17、18、19、20、21、22、23、24、25、26、27依法有效。但涉案被保险船舶为“大湖船”，而原告证据15的译文不准确，应予纠正。原告证据8、9、10为证人证言，因证人未到庭作证，与被告的疑问无法对质，故对其证据效力本院不予确认。被告第二组证据中港口日志显示的涉案船舶目的港为印度Alang港一节，因原告证据22的内容成立而被否定，故难以作为定案的根据。被告第三组、第五组证据，第四组证据中的英国Sedgwick调查公司的传真件，以及英国救助协会首席航海工程师J．B．Waite发给被告的传真件，因未经公证、认证，依法尚不能产生证据效力。被告的其他证据依法应予确认。
　　根据上述有效证据所反映的事实查明：1995年2月27日，应原告提出的投保要求，被告签署了编号为PSH001HI95/2545－001、PSH001HI95/2545－002两份船舶保险单。其中PSH001HI95/2545－001号保险单载明，被保险人为原告，被保险船舶为“加拿大丰收”轮(CANADIAN HARVEST)，船舶种类系散货船，船舶总吨位7810吨，建造年份1965年，造船地点、注册地点、船级、船旗均为加拿大，保险价值和保险金额1249600美元，保险费率2．1%，保险费26241．60美元，保险条件为全损和救助适用1986年1月1日的中国人民保险公司船舶保险条款，航行范围自加拿大蒙特利尔经好望角到中国，保险期限或航程(Period/Voyage)从1995年4月20日开始(STARTING ON 20TH APRIL，1995)，免赔额5000美元。批注栏内注有“除非被保险人获得合格的检验师对所述船舶签发的适拖证书，否则保险单无效；除非被保险人于1995年4月20日前支付了保险金，否则保险人有权取消保险单”的内容。另一份保险单记载的内容除船舶资料外均相同。但被告于同年4月19日出具了该保险单的批单，将保险期限修改为从1995年4月30日起至船舶低达中国时止，被告于同年6月3日收到了原告支付的保险费。
　　原告投保的涉案船舶由陈氏海事公司于1995年2月16日，以921900美元的合同价款从加拿大UPPER LAKES航运公司购入，由陈氏海事公司转归原告。1995年4月6日，原告通过订立船舶买卖合同，将该两轮销售给常州益升拆船有限公司，单价为中国交货每长吨160美元，约定的交货时间为同年的7、8月间。同年3月22日，原告与巴拿马M·R航海有限公司签订了代号为“TOWCON”的国际船舶拖航合同，约定由“阿兹·尼夫塔各兹－16”轮 (AHIS NEFTEGAZ－16) 自加拿大的索来尔，将涉案两轮拖带至中国北方的一个安全港，预计最早出发日期(自/至)1995年4月26日至5月2日。
　　同年5月16日，加拿大格罗贝克斯海事公司海事检验员克来得·雷迈签发了涉案两轮的适拖证书，载明：“检验员应邀对‘加拿大探路者’轮和‘加拿大丰收’轮进行检验并确认，该两轮符合由‘尼夫塔名兹－16’轮拖带自加拿大蒙特利尔至中国的要求。对于上述航程已向拖轮船长提供建议，从各方面看已具备于1995年5月16日起拖。”同年4月24日2330时，涉案拖轮抵达蒙特利尔港，在做了修理引擎、加油等一系列起拖前的准备工作后，于同年5月30日1230时拖带涉案两轮驶离皮·沃·皮克区。同年6月5日，“尼夫塔各兹－16”轮发生螺旋桨被绞缠，左舷主机失速和右舷主机因润滑油压力丧失并造成损坏的事故。同年6月14日该轮停靠在新斯科舍省马尔格雷夫港。同年10月3日，被移至哈利法克斯进行修理。此前，由俄罗斯船舶登记局对拖轮损坏情况进行了检验。
　　同年10月10日，加拿大格罗贝克斯海事公司的海事检验员克来得·雷迈再次签发两艘船舶的适拖证书，称“已具备于1995年10月10日起拖”。同年12月1日，“尼夫塔各兹－16”轮再次起拖。同年12月3日加拿大时间0624时，在位于北纬44度25．8分，西径57度09．3分处，拖轮大副通过雷达看到“加拿大丰收”轮的船尾部分脱离船体。当时的天气状况：风向320度，风速20～25米/秒，浪向315度，浪高6～7米，能见度5海里。同年12月4日2000时，风速22米/秒，风向195度，浪高5米。同年12月5日0000时，风速约30米/秒，浪高8米。同日0448时，位置北纬42度30．6分，西径53度45．9分，为避免拖船受损和“加拿大探路者”轮的安全，“加拿大丰收”轮的拖缆被从拖轮起拖机上放松并被丢离甲板，该轮残体沉没。事发当时加拿大海岸警卫队根据拖轮船长报告，发布了航行通告。英国劳合社也曾发布了海难事故紧急报告。
　　1995年12月4日，原告以传真形式将被保险船舶的出险情况通知了被告。至同年12月28日，原、被告双方多次传真协商理赔事宜。其中，原告在12月7日的传真中称：“船队预计启拖日为1995年4月20日”，“因种种因素5月29日才启航”；被告在12月26日的传真中认为由于被保险船舶迟延起拖，涉案保险合同的效力自动终止。
　　“加拿大丰收”轮曾用名“里毛斯基”(RIMOUSKI)。该轮及“加拿大探路者”轮均为航行于加拿大大湖区，内河以及圣劳伦斯水道的“大湖船”。无有效证据证明原告已将涉案拖轮两次起拖的时间和拖轮作重大修理的事实在出险前告知过被告，亦无证据证明原告将涉案被保险船舶用于拆解的航行目的和为“大湖船”的事实在订立合同前告知过被告。
　　涉案保险单背面印有1986年1月1日中国人民保险公司船舶保险条款全部内容。其中第四条“海运”记有：“除非事先征得保险人的同意并接受修改后的承保条件所须加付的保费，否则，本保险对下列情况所造成的损失和责任均不负责：(一)被保险船舶从事拖带或救助服务。(二)(略)。(三)被保险船舶作为拆船或拆船目的出售的意图航行。”第六条“保险终止”记有：“当货物、航程、航行区域、拖带、救助工作或开航日期方面有违背保险单条款规定时，被保险人在接到消息后，应立即通知保险人并同意接受修改后的承保条件及所需加付的保险费，本保险仍继续有效，否则，本保险应自动终止。”第五条“保险期限”记有：“(三)航次保险：按保单订明的航次为准。起止时间按下列规定办理：1．不载货船舶，自起运港解缆起锚时开始至目的港抛锚或系缆完毕时终止。2．载货船舶，自起运港装货时开始至目的港卸货完毕时终止，但自船舶抵达目的港当日午夜零点起最多不得超过30天。”
　　本院认为：因当事人双方系分别设立在不同国家的企业，故本案纠纷具有涉外因素。依照法律规定，除另有规定外，涉外关系的合同当事人可以选择合同适用的法律；合同当事人没有选择的，适用与合同有最密切联系的国家的法律。查涉案保险合同并无法律适用条款，相关的法律对涉外保险合同的法律适用也未作出其他特别规定。而涉案保险合同签订于上海，合同约定的被保险船舶的拖带目的港为中国港口。所以可认定中华人民共和国法律是“与合同有最密切联系的国家的法律”之一，本案纠纷的处理应适用《中华人民共和国海商法》(下称海商法)和其他的有关法律及法规。原告为履行与常州益升拆船有限公司订立的船舶买卖合同，就涉案船舶向被告投保，被告同意承保并签发了船舶保险单，原、被告双方的海上船舶保险合同即依法成立，双方均应依照法律规定和合同约定履行合同义务，行使合同权利。被保险船舶用于拆解的事实已经庭审查实，原告也予确认，但并无证据证明原告已将此情况在合同订立前告知被告。海商法第二百二十二条第一款规定：“合同订立前，被保险人应当将其知道的或者在通常业务中应当知道的有关影响保险人据以确定保险费率或者确定是否同意承保的重要情况，如实告知保险人。”保险标的的风险大小是影响保险人确定保险费率或者确定是否同意承保的重要因素。与一般船舶比较，用于拆解的船舶其海上风险明显增加。如果保险人知道这一情况，通常会提出增加保费在内的附加条件。涉案保险条款第四条也明确指出，如被保险船舶作为拆船或者拆船目的出售的意图航行，除非事先征得保险人的同意并接受修改后的承保条件所须加付的保费，否则保险人对由此情况所造成的损失和责任不负责任。因此，应该认为，虽然海商法对所谓“重要情况”未作明确定义，但凡是增加保险风险的情况即为“重要情况”。涉案船舶用于拆解，显然属“重要情况”之列。原告在订立合同前未将其告知被告，不但违反了保险条款的约定，而且违反法律规定。由于用于拆解的船舶对保险事故的发生有重要影响，因而不管原告是否故意不作告知，被告均有权依照海商法第二百二十三条的规定解除合同而不承担保险赔偿责任。原告称已在被告公司投保用于拆解的废旧船舶多次，涉案船舶投保时被告也实际了解该轮是用于拆解的废旧船，并由此收取了2．1%高额保险费，缺乏证据支持。
　　本院还认为：在合理时间内开航构成保险合同的保证条款。被保险人违反该条款的，保险人依法享有解除合同或者要求修改承保条件、增加保险费的权利。被保险人违反保证条款时，应当立即通知保险人。被保险人不通知的，不影响保险人权利的行使。本案为海上船舶航次保险合同，对此原、被告双方认识一致，并无任何异议。涉案船舶并无载货，按涉案保险条款第五条内容，不载货船舶航次保险的责任期间为自起运港解缆起锚时开始至目的港抛锚或系缆完毕时终止。因此，涉案保险单保险期限或航程载明的1995年4月20日开始，并非是指1995年4月20日涉案船舶必须在该日开始起拖，但也并非表明涉案船舶在该日后的任何时间起拖均符合合同的约定。根据船舶航次保险的特点和保险行业惯例，对此的合理解释应为被保险船舶应在该日或该日后的一段合理期间内起拖。超过合理时间起拖，可能会使预定航程出现双方在订约当时所不能预见的保险风险，使双方的订约基础发生质的变化。因此，在合理时间内开航构成保险合同的保证条款。按照涉案保险单约定，涉案航程应自1995年4月20日开始，但被保险船舶“加拿大丰收”轮的首次起拖时间为同年的5月30日，间隔长达四十天之久，已不能认为是在合理时间内开始航程。其后，因拖轮“尼夫塔各兹－16”轮作重大修理，于同年12月1日才再次起拖。以上情况原告均未及时通知被告。原告的不作为行为，违背了涉案保险条款第六条规定的合同义务，同时，也违反了海商法第二百三十五条的规定，应承担由此产生的法律责任。
　　本院另认为：确无证据证明原告已将“加拿大丰收”轮为“大湖船”的情况在订立合同前告知被告，但被告就此认为原告违反海商法第二百二十二条第一款的规定，其理由和证据尚嫌不足。为涉案船舶自加拿大拖带至中国，加拿大格罗贝克斯海事公司的海事检验员克来得·雷迈两次签发适拖证书，被告称适拖证书无效，但无任何证据证明，因此适拖证书本身的效力应予确认。涉案被保险船舶的目的港为中国港口，有保险单、船舶买卖合同等大量证据证明，被告仅依据一份港口日志即认定原告变更目的港为印度的Alang港，缺乏说服力。陈氏海事公司购进涉案船舶转交原告用于出口销售的事实，证据充分，原告因此对被保险船舶依法享有可保利益，有权提起本案诉讼。“加拿大丰收”轮在海上航行过程中遭受风浪袭击而沉没全损，被告称原告未能证明由于保险单所列明的承保风险引起保险标的的损失，证据不足。涉案保险单背面印有中国人民保险公司1986年1月1日船舶保险条款的全部内容，故原告称被告未向原告提供该船舶保险条款，也未告知该条款的有关内容，缺乏事实依据。
　　综上所述，本案保险合同依法成立，原告对涉案“加拿大丰收”轮依法具有可保利益，有权提起本案诉讼。但是，原告在订立合同前未将该轮是用于拆解的船舶告知被告；在合同履行过程中，又未将涉案拖轮未能在合理的时间内开航和进行重大修理，以及再次起拖的时间等情况及时通知被告，违反法律规定和合同约定。因此，对原告的诉讼请求，本院难以支持。
　　兹依照《中华人民共和国海商法》第二百二十一条、第二百二十二条第一款、第二百二十三条、第二百三十五条之规定，判决如下：
　　对原告美国陈氏公司的诉讼请求不予支持。
　　本案案件受理费人民币61868．40元，由原告负担。
　　如不服本判决，原告可在本判决书送达之日起三十日内，被告可在本判决书送达之日起十五日内，向本院递交上诉状，并按对方当事人的人数提出副本，上诉于上海市高级人民法院。在递交上诉状的次日起七日内，应按判决确定的一审案件受理费同等金额向本院预缴上诉费。逾期按自动撤回上诉处理。

审判长　　　倪春南　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
代理审判员　王国梁　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
代理审判员　杨莉莎　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
一九九九年十二月十三日　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
书记员　　　沈　军　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

评析：　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
客观叙述案件事实，注重证据的运用，合理解释合同条款和相关法律规定，详尽的论述，充分的表达，是这篇裁判文书的的写作特点。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
一、注重案件事实认定的证据原则，对当事人的诉辩主张、举证、质证、法院的认证过程叙述全面，条理清晰，案件事实清楚明了。详细列举双方当事人提交的证据材料，并对每一项证据材料逐项加以认证分析，明确表示采信或不采信的理由。以此为基础，案件事实认定有了充分的依据。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
二、判决论理层次清晰，条理分明，论述充分。在做出实体裁判之前，首先确定案件适用的法律，这是涉外案件审理的特点。同时，就案件涉及的主要法律问题分别加以分析、阐述。如拖带用于拆解船舶风险大于通常意义上拖带的船舶，作为船舶所有人的原告未经将这一重要情况在合同订立前如实告知船舶保险人，违反了海上保险如实告知原则，保险人有权解除合同并不承担赔偿责任。在航次保险合同中，合理时间内开航构成保险合同的保证条款，原告违反此约定应立即通知保险人，保险人享有合同解除或修改合同承保条件的选择权。法院据此判决驳回原告的诉讼请求。